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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Authentication or identification of real evidence refers
to the requirement of proving that an item of evidence is
genuine, i.e., that it is what its proponent claims it to be.
McCormick expressed the requirement in this way:
"[W]hen real evidence is offered an adequate foundation
for admission will require testimony first that the object
offered is the object which was involved in the incident,
and further that the condition of the object is substantially unchanged." 2 C. McCormick, Evidence 8 (4th ed. 1992)
EVIDENCE RULE 901
Federal Evidence Rule 901(a) codifies this requirement:
''The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." The Ohio rule is
identical.

Identity of Evidence
It is often necessary to show that the item seized at a
crime scene or place of arrest, such as drugs, was the
same item analyzed at the crime laboratory and
introduced at trial. There are two principal methods of
proving the identity of real evidence: first, establishing
that the evidence is "readily identifiable," and second,
establishing a "chain of custody."
Both methods are discussed later in this article.
Condition of Evidence
In addition to showing that the object introduced in
evidence is the same object as the one involved in the
crime, the proponent of the evidence must show that the
object has retained its relevant evidentiary characteristics. Alteration of the item may reduce or negate its
probative value and may mislead the jury. Thus, before
physical objects are admissible in evidence the proponent must establish that they are in "substantially the
same condition as when the crime was committed."
Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960).
Accord United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); United
States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1980) ("condition is materially unchanged").

Determining what changes are "substantial" depends
on how the changes affect the relevance of the evidence.
Radically altered items of evidence may still be admitted
if their pertinent features remain unaltered:
Even though the object is not in exactly the same
condition at trial as at the time in issue- or even if
in substantially the same condition- the exhibit
may still be admitted if the changes can be
explained, and they do not destroy the evidentiary
value of the object. Comment, "Preconditions for
Admission of Demonstrative Evidence," 61 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 472, 484 (1966).
McCormick said it this way: "It should, however, always
be borne in mind that foundational requirements are
essentially requirements of logic, and not rules of art..
Thus, e.g., even a radically altered item of real evidence
may be admissible if its pertinent features remain
unaltered." 2 C. McCormick, supra at 8-9.
For example, in United States v. Skelley, 501 F.2d 447
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974), counterfeit
bills were admissible even though they apparently
changed color due to tests for fingerprints. According to
the court, the change in color did not "destroy the relevance of the bills to show their counterfeit character from
the identity of serial numbers, and their competence as
evidence for this purpose [was) unimpaired by the ...
possibility of a change in color." /d. at 451.
See also Davidson v. State, 208 Ga. 834, 836, 69
S.E.2d 757, 759 (1952) (victim's clothing admissible
although washed); Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 238,375
N.E.2d 1042, 1073 (1978) (contamination "in no way vitiated the evidentiary value of the exhibits"), cert. denied,
439 u.s. 988 (1978).
READILY IDENTIFIABLE EVIDENCE
If an object is easily identified, there may be no need to
establish a chain of custody. McCormick refers to such
items as "unique and readily identifiable." 2 C. McCormick,
supra at 8. As one Ohio court has noted:
If an exhibit is directly identified by a witness as the
object which is involved in the case, then that direct
identification is sufficient. Such is the case with
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many objects which have special identifying characteristics, such as a number or mark, or are made to
have such identifying characteristics by special marks.
State v._Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 59, 288 N.E.2d
296, 300 (1971).
See also United States v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810, 813 (9th
Cir.) ("Counterfeit notes ... printed from a single plate,
are unique and identifiable without proof of a chain of
custody"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United
States v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir.) ("The chain of
custody is not relevant when a witness identifies the
object as the actual object about which he has testified"),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971); State v. Malone, 694
S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1985) (chain of custody not required
if there is a positive identification), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1165 (1986).
The Federal Rules recognize this method of identification. Rule 901(b)(4), entitled "Distinctive characteristics
and the like," provides that "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances" may satisfy
the authentication requirement. The Ohio rule is identical.
Numerous examples of authenticating readily identifiable objects are found in the cases. All of these examples
involve objects whose characteristics somehow make
them unique.

F.2d 412, 412 (10th Cir. 1967) (stolen money).
Laboratory slides: Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767,
770 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d
19, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019
(1954); State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 178-80, 185 P.2d
757, 759-61 (1947).

Distinctive Items
Third, an object may possess distinctive natural
characteristics which may make it readily identifiable.
E.g., United States v. Reed, 392 F.2d 865, 867 (7th Cir.)
("very unusual looking hat"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984
(1968); Reyes v. United States, 383 F.2d 734, 734 (9th Cir.
1967) (holdup note "was unique and readily identifiable").
For example, in United States v. Briddle, 443 F.2d 443
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971), the prosecution introduced evidence that a button top found at the
scene of a burglary came from the defendant's coat. The
police officer described the button as follows:
It had a picture of a whale on the front of it. It was
leather ... And it had a sticky substance on the back,
as though it might have been stuck to something ...
It was a dark brown in color. Had a whale or fish on it.
The tail was up in the air. Split. And I believe it was the
left eye of the animal that was up. /d. at 448.
The Eighth Circuit held this identification sufficient:
"Given the uniqueness of the buttons on Briddle's coat,
we think this identification evidence established that the
exhibit ... was the button top found at the scene of
the burglary." /d. at 449.
Thus, the issue is whether the distinctive characteristics are sufficient to make it unlikely that another object
would have the same characteristics.

Serially Numbered Items
First, any item imprinted with a serial number, such as
a weapon or dollar bill, may be identified by that number.
E.g., Calderon v. United States, 269 F.2d 416, 419 (10th
Cir. 1959) (money); Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850, 854,
410 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1967) (gun); State v. Conley, 32 Ohio
App. 2d 54, 60, 288 N.E.2d 296, 300-01 (1971) (money);
State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1978) (gun).

Witness' Uncertainty
A witness' uncertainty in identifying an exhibit,
however, affects the weight, not the admissibility, of the
evidence. For example, the Ninth Circuit has written:
[A]Ithough the trial record reveals the identification of
the ax made by Papse may not have been entirely free
from doubt, the witness did state that he was "pretty
sure" this was the weapon Johnson had used against
him, that he saw the ax in Johnson's hand, and that he
was personally familiar with this particular ax because
he had used it in the past. Based on Papse's testimony,
a reasonable juror could have found that his ax was
the weapon allegedly used in the assault. Papse's
ability or inability to specify particular identifying
features of the ax, as well as the evidence of the ax's
alleged changed condition, should then go to the
question of weight to be accorded this evidence, which
is precisely what the trial court ruled. In other words,
although the jury remained free to reject the government's assertion that this ax had been used in the
assault, the requirements for admissibility specified in
Rule 901(a) had been met. United States v. Johnson,
637 F.2d 1224, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1980).
Accord Howland v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 162, 171, 186
N.W.2d 319, 323 (1971) ("[T]he witness' lack of certitude
f
as to whether the objects offered are the ones he saw on
a prior occasion goes to the weight the jury should give
to the evidence, but lack of certitude does not preclude
admissibility").

Police Markings
Second, an object that is inscribed with the initials or
markings of a police officer or other person may be readily identifiable. In such cases, the person converts a nonunique object into a readily identifiable one by placing
distinctive markings on it. This practice is recommended
in crime scene and evidence collection manuals. See
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic
Science 100 (rev. ed. 1984); C. O'Hara, Fundamentals of
Criminal Investigation 79-84 (5th ed. 1980).
This method of identification is also well accepted in
the cases. Numerous items have been admitted under
this method:
Firearms: United States v. Madril, 445 F.2d 827, 828
(9th Cir. 1971} (pistol), vacated on other grounds, 404
U.S. 1010 (1972); Dixon v. State, 2431nd. 654, 656-57,
189 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1963) (shotgun).
Bullets: Sims v. State, 243 Ga. 83, 85, 252 S.E.2d 501,
503 (1979); State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 553-54, 169
S.E.2d 875, 878 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050
(1970). See also Almodovar v. State, 464 N.E.2d 906,
911 (Ind. 1984) (initials scratched on shell casing).
Currency: United States v. Capocci, 433 F.2d 155, 157
(1st Cir. 1970) (counterfeit bill); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 72-73 (10th Cir.) (coin), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 915 (1969); Rosemund v. United States, 386
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sian necessary to validate the F.B.I. analysis of them." /d.
at 139, 183 S.E.2d at 181. See also Graham v. State, 253
Ind. 525, 532-34, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655-56 (1970) (wrapper
containing white powder initialed at time police took
possession but break in chain of custody prior to
chemical analysis resulted in reversal).

CHAIN OF CUSTODY
The use of a chain of custody to authenticate evidence
is well established in criminal trials. Nevertheless, two
commentators have written that the governing federal
rule "can easily be read as doing away with any chain of
custody requirement." 2 S. Saltzburg & M. Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 478 (5th ed. 1990) (citing
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). This seems doubtful. If anything,
there is a need for more stringent requirements. The
mass processing of immunoassay tests and the increasing
volume of DNA testing heightens the importance of proper
handling procedures. Indeed, improper labeling was the
cause of an error in a DNA proficiency test. Thompson,
"The Myth of DNA Fingerprints," 9 Cal. La.w. 34 (Apr.
1989) (Cell mark official admitted that the "error occurred
because a lab technician incorrectly labeled a vial").
In some situations the proponent must establish a
chain of custody. Proof of the chain of custody may be
necessary either because the item of evidence is not
readily identifiable, or because more than simple identification is necessary to establish the item's relevance.

Condition of Object
Third, if the condition of the object, not merely its identity, is the relevant issue, a chain of custody may be
required to establish that the object has not been altered
during police custody. This requirement is a necessary
safeguard for evidence that is susceptible to undetected
contamination or deterioration, such as blood samples.
See Lynch v. State, 687 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. App. 1985)
(chain of custody required for blood in a criminal case);
Ritter v. State, 3 Tenn. Grim. App. 372, 462 S.W.2d 247,
249 (1970) ("Blood specimens ... should be handled
with the greatest of care and all persons who handle the
specimen should be ready to identify it and testify to its
custody and unchanged condition").
See also Glendening & Waugh, "The Stability of Ordinary Blood Alcohol Samples Held Various Periods of
Time Under Different Conditions," 10 J. Forensic Sci.
192, 199 (1965) (showing instability of alcohol content in
blood samples for different temperatures and storage
periods).

Fungible Objects
First, a chain of custody is often required for fungible
evidence because these items have no unique characteristics. The inability to distinguish between fungible
items makes positive identification by observation alone
impossible. See State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 59,
288 N.E.2d 296, 300 (1971) ("One white pill looks much
like any other white pill and hence positive identification
simply by observation is usually impossible").
In addition, the nature of these items frequently makes
them particularly susceptible to tampering or loss. As
one court has noted, the "danger of tampering, loss, or
mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest where the
exhibit is small and is one which has J:?hysical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
Graham v. State, 2531nd. 525, 531, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655
(1970). See also United States v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810,
812-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971)
("Narcotic drugs are fungible and, being such, evidence
of a continuous chain of possession is often necessary ...").
Nevertheless, the proper handling of fungible evidence
- using lock-sealed envelopes that "can be opened only
by destroying the seals" - makes the evidence readily
identifiable and eliminates most problems of misidentification and contamination. United States v. Santiago, 534
F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976).

LENGTH OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY
When a chain of custody is required, either to show
the identity of the item or its unchanged condition, it is
necessary to determine where the chain begins and
ends. Only breaks in possession that occur within the
period included in the chain of custody affect admissibility.
The Initial Link
Disputes over the initial link in the chain of custody
focus on whether the continuous possession requirement should apply at the time of the incident at issue or
at the time when the evidence comes into possession of
its proponent. According to one position, a "chain-ofcustody foundation is not required ... for periods before
the evidence comes into the possession of law enforcement personnel." Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 265, 269-70,
379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978). The theory underlying this
rule is that "the State cannot be charged with the responsibility of accounting for the custody of the exhibit" when
it is not in its possession. Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625,
629, 283 N.E.2d 540,543 (1972).
This rule has been applied in two different types of
cases: first-, those in which a third party had possession
of the object prior to the time it was turned over to the
police, Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 629-30, 283 N.E.2d
540, 543 {1972), and second, those in which the object
was not discovered at the crime scene until sometime
after the commission of the crime. Williams v. State, 269
Ind. 265, 269-70, 379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978) (three-hour
delay in discovery of revolver); Thornton v. State, 268 Ind.
456,459-60,376 N.E.2d 492,494 (1978) (knife discovered
in open field subsequent to arrest).
This position misconceives the purpose of the chain of
custody rule. The rule is not designed to hold the police
accountable, but rather to ensure that evidence is relevant.

Laboratory Analysis
Second, if the relevance of an exhibit depends on its
subsequent laboratory analysis, identification by police
markings made at the scene does not provide a sufficient
foundation. The markings establish that the exhibit in
court was the item seized by the police, but a chain of ·
custody may be necessary to establish that the item
seized was the item analyzed at the crime laboratory.
For example, in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
136, 183 S.E.2d 179 (1971), the court reversed a rape
conviction due to a break in the chain of custody: "The
mere fact that the blouse and the panties were identified
[by the victim at trial] did not prove the chain of posses-
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Police accountability is a means to this end. If the relevance of an object depends on its use in a crime, the
offering party must establish, through a chain of custody
or otherwise, a connection between that object and the
crime. For example, if a third party finds a rifle near a
cl-ime scene and turns it over to the police several hours
or days after the crime, it would be necessary to "account"
for the rifle during the time it was in the third party's
possession in order to tie the rifle to the place where the
crime occurred.
For example, in United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978), the court
noted: "This is not a routine chain of custody situation in
which the chain is broken between seizure of the evidence
from the accused and a subsequent trial. Rather, the
alleged break occurred before the government came into
possession of the heroin." /d. at 266. After citing the rule
in the "typical chain of custody cases," the court wrote:
"We apply the same rule in the instant case." /d.
See also United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1073.
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977) (2 to 3-hour
gap before evidence seized); People v. Brown, 115
A.D.2d 610, 610, 496 N.Y.S.2d 272, 272 (1985) (piece of
rug recovered five days after crime held inadmissible).

concerning the nature of the drugs. See United States v.
Bailey, 277 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1960) ("Even if the
exhibits, including the heroin, had not been introduced in
evidence the testimony of the witnesses and the stipulation as to the chemical analysis were sufficient ...").
Moreover, the prosecution generally is not required to
introduce real evidence in order to prove its case:
It is not always necessary that tangible evidence be
physically admitted at a trial ... Even when evidence
is available it need not be physically offered. Thus, the
grand larceny of an automobile may be established
merely on competent testimony describing the stolen
vehicle without actually producing the automobile before
the trier of fact. Holle v. State, 26 Md. App. 267, 274,
337 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1975) (stolen marked currency).
Accord United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941 (2d
Cir. 1980) (heroin); Chandler v. United States, 318 F.2d
356, 357 (10th Cir. 1963) (whiskey bottles). Finally, the socalled "best evidence" rule applies only to writings,
recordings, and photographs, not to real evidence. See
Fed. R. Evid. 1002.

Other Problems
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted
a contrary position. According to the court, "when a
defendant is charged with possession of a controlled
substance, that substance, if available, must be introduced into evidence." G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 977
(Fla. 1982). In support of this rule, the court wrote:
An absolute rule that a substance may be introduced
or not at the discretion of the prosecutor is practically
undesirable because of its potential for abuse. For
example, such prosecutorial discretion could deliberately or unwittingly be used to confuse defense counsel and thwart the ability to make certain objections,
particularly objections to chain of custody ...
The state's failure to introduce the substance in
evidence against the defendant might put the defendant in the awkward position of introducing it himself
should he wish to challenge its authenticity where
there has been testimony of its existence as here ...
/d. at 977-78.
In addition, the loss or destruction of the evidence after
laboratory analysis may affect the defendant's right to
reexamine the evidence, which could result in the exclusion of expert testimony based on the prior laboratory
examination. See 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence§ 3-7 (2d ed. 1993) (constitutional duty to
preserve evidence).

The Final Link
Disagreement over the point at which the chain of
custody ends focuses on whether the chain ends when
the item is introduced at trial or at an earlier stage, e.g.,
when a laboratory analyzes the item. Some commentators have read several cases as requiring the prosecution
to trace the chain of custody from the time of seizure until
the time of trial in all cases. See An not., 21 A.L.R.2d
1216, 1236 (1952). There may be some support for this
view in the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule
901, where the drafters refer to "establishing narcotics as
taken from an accused and accounting for custody through
the period until trial, including laboratory analysis."
The "length" of the chain of custody, however,
depends on the purpose for which the evidence is
offered. This point is illustrated by State v. Conley, Ohio
App. 2d 54, 288 N.E.2d 296 (1971), which involved a
prosecution for the illegal sale of LSD. The drugs were
purchased with marked bills whose serial numbers had
been recorded. The defendant objected to both the
admissibility of the bills and the LSD. The court wrote:
To identify a particular item ... as being part of a pertinent incident in the past usually requires the showing
of a continuous chain of custodians up to the material
moment. When a chemical analysis is involved ... the
material moment is the moment of analysis, since this
provides the basis for the expert testimony and makes
that testimony relevant to the case. In the case of many
other items, the material moment occurs at the trial. /d.
at 59-60,288 N.E.2d at 300.
The court went on to hold that the chain of custody for the
marked bills ran from the time the bills were marked until
the trial, at which time they were identified. The chain of
custody for the drugs differed; it ran from the time of
seizure to the time of chemical analysis.
As a matter of relevancy, this approach is sound. The
loss or destruction of the drugs after chemical analysis
would not affect the relevance of the expert's testimony

LINKS IN THE CHAIN
The "links" in the chain of custody are those persons
who have had physical custody of the object. Persons
who have had access to, but not possession of, the
evidence generally need not be accounted for. Such
persons are not custodians. As noted by one court:
"There is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce as
witnesses all persons who were in a position to come into
contact with the article sought to be introduced in
evidence." Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917
(9th Cir. 1960).
Accord United States v. Fletcher, 487 F.2d 22, 23 (5th
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about the informant's handling of the drugs. Thus, a
noncustodian with first-hand knowledge may supply
evidence of the object's handling while in the custody of
the nontestifying informant. E.g., United States v. Jones,
404 F. Supp. 529, 542 {E.D. Pa. 1975) (undercover agent
observed defendant giving drugs to informant; informant
did not testify), aff'd, 538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976).
The testimony of a custodial link also may be
dispensed with when circumstantial evidence sufficiently
connects a defendant with drugs purchased from him by
an informant, i.e. a "controlled drug buy." For example, in
Peden v. United States, 223 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 971 (1959), an informant was
searched prior to a drug transaction and provided with
marked money. While under surveillance, she met the
defendant, and both were immediately arrested and
searched. The informant had morphine and the defendant had the marked money. Although the informant did
not testify, the court held the chain sufficient to connect
the defendant with the morphine. /d. See also United
States v. Amaro, 422 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1970).

Cir. 1973) (fact that "fifteen persons had access to the
evidence room" affects weight, not admissibility), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974); Reyes v. United States, 383
F.2d 734, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) ("(T)he Government was
under no obligation to produce as witnesses all persons
who may have handled exhibit 1").
Breaks
Failure to account for the evidence during possession
by a custodian, however, may constitute a critical break
in the chain of custody- for example:
United States v. Panczko, 353'F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir.
1965) ("There is no evidence as to where or from
whom Lieutenant Remkus got the keys"), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966);
Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588, 589 (D.C.
Cir. 1947) (evidence failed "to identify the sample
from which the analyses were made as being that
sample taken from the appellant");
Smith v. United States, 157 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(witness testified that watch presented in court had
been handed to him by police officer at scene but he
did not see where officer obtained watch);
United States v. Lewis, 19 M.J. 869 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985)
(prosecution failed to show that urine sample analyzed at lab was the sample taken from the defendant).

Postal Employees
Postal employees who handle evidence sent to a crime
laboratory by mail are custodial links. Postal employees
rarely, if ever, testify at trial, however. A rule requiring
every custodian to testify would necessitate calling all
postal employees who handled the evidence. This would
"place an impossible burden upon the state." Trantham v.
State, 508 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Okla. Grim. App. 1973).
Therefore, courts invoke the presumption that "articles
transported by regular United States mail and delivered
in the ordinary course of the mails are delivered in
substantially the same condition in which they were
sent." Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 861, 50 N .W.2d 78,
78 {1951). See also Pasadena Research Laboratories,
Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 382 (9th Cir.)
{presumption of regularity applies to postal employees'
handling of vials during shipment), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
853 (1948); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 531,
90 S.E.2d 257,259-60 (1955) {"In proving identity legal
presumptions may of course be relied upon unless
rebutted, e.g., that articles regularly mailed are delivered
in substantially the same condition in which they were
sent").
But see Miller v. State, 484 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Ala.
Grim. App. 1986) (no presumption of delivery where
blood specimen placed in agency's "regular outgoing
mail" rather than U.S. mail).
Many law enforcement agencies recommend registered mail or other similar means for sending evidence.
F.B.I., supra at 103 ("Ship [physical evidence] by U.S.
Postal Service, Registered Mail, United Parcel Service,
Federal Express, or air freight"). See also United States
v. Godoy, 528 F.2d 281, 283 {9th Cir. 1975) (narcotics sent
by registered mail to laboratory); United States v. Jackson,
482 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1973) {registered, special delivery,
air mail).
Furthermore, the FBI recommends stringent packaging requirements for items mailed to its laboratory. F.B.I.,
supra at 103 (use suitable containers, package each item
separately, and seal securely). Proof that these procedures were followed, and not the presumption of due

Testimony of Links
Some courts have indicated that all the links in the
chain of custody must testify at trial. E.g., People v.
Connelly, 35 N.Y.2d 171, 174, 316 N.E.2d 706, 708,359
N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (1974) ("[A]dmissibility generally
requires that all those who have handled the item
'identify it and testify to its custody and unchanged
condition' ").The prevalent view, however, is that "the
fact of a 'missing link does not prevent the admission of
real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that the
evidence is what it purports to be.'" United States v.
Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 u.s. 874 (1982).
See also United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371,
1374 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he prosecution was not required to call
the custodian of the evidence"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
164 (1991); United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528,
1532 (10th Cir.) ("There is no rule that the prosecution
must produce all persons who had custody of the
evidence to testify at trial"), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909
{1989); People v. Jones, 148 Ill. App. 3d 345, 499 N.E.2d
510, 514 {1986) {"A sufficient chain of custody does not
require every person involved in the chain to testify").
Thus, while a custodian in the chain of possession
need not testify under all circumstances, the evidence
should be accounted for during the time it was under that
custodian's control. Several recurrent examples of "missing link" cases are discussed below.
Informants
The authentication of evidence by means other than
the testimony of custodial links frequently arises in drug
cases where an informant who had handled the drugs
does not testify at trial. In this situation, an undercover
officer who had accompanied the informant can 'testify
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delivery, assures the reliability of the evidence.

Minor links
Another category of cases involves what may be called
"minor links"- intermediate custodians who had
possession for a short period of time and merely passed
the evidence along to another link. For example, in one
case a chief chemist, who had received a sealed envelope of heroin and then turned it over to the examining
chemist, did not testify. The court upheld the admissibility of the evidence because the seal was "unbroken when
the latter received it." United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d
215, 216 n.1 (1st Cir. 1972). Accord United States v.
Williams, 809 F.2d 75, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1986) (lab technician
need not testify), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); United States v. Glaze, 643 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1981)
(nontestifying chemist received and transported narcotics to testifying chemist).
The category of minor links whose testimony is not
required to establish a chain of custody includes not only
laboratory personnel, but also police officers who receive
evidence from seizing officer and mail or transported it
to a laboratory for analysis. E.g., United States v. Jones,
404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (E. D. Pa. 1975) (testimony of officer
who mailed heroin to lab not necessary where sealed
packages initialed and return receipt introduced), aff'd,
538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lampson,
627 F.2d 62, 65.(7th Cir. 1980) (deputy sheriff who transported evidence did not testify); Bay v. State, 489 N.E.2d
1220, 1223 (Ind. App. 1986) (detective who transported
marijuana to lab did not testify).
See also State v. Goad, 692 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tenn. Grim.
App. 1985) (property room custodian need not testify);
United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir.)
(officer who carried cocaine to evidence room did not
testify), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989).
In short, "accounting for" all the links in the chain of
custody does not necessarily mean all the links need
testify at trial.

a

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
The burden of proving the chain of custody rests with
the party offering the evidence. United States v. Santiago, 534 F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976); 1 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers rev. 1983).
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the courts described the standard of proof in various
ways. The most common expression of the standard was
that the offering party had to establish the identity and
condition of the exhibit by a "reasonable probability."
E.g., United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir.
1973) ("reasonable probability the article has not been
changed in any important respect'); United States v.
Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Phrases such as "reasonable certainty" and
"reasonable assurance" seem only variants of this standard. United States v. Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (E. D.
Pa. 1975); State v. Cress, 344 A.2d 57, 61 (Me. 1975);
State v. Baines, 394 S.W.2d 312,316 (Mo. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 992 (1966).
The reasonable probability standard appears to
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require no more than the "preponderance of evidence"
or "more probable than not" standard. See People v.
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 580-81, 305 P.2d 1, 10 ("The
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when
some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence
analyzed was not the evidence originally received"),
appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646 (1959).
Moreover, chain of custody "requirements go to the
competency of the evidence, not merely to its credibility."
State v. Serl, 269 N.W.2d 785, 789 (S.D. 1978). Under this
view, the trial court determines whether this standard has
been satisfied. "That determination is to be made by the
trial judge, not the jury ..." United States v. Brown, 482
F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973). Accord United States v.
Daughtry, 502 F.2d 1019, 1021-23 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).

Federal Rules
In contrast, Federal Rule 901(a) requires only that the
offering party introduce "evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims." Thus, the trial court does not decide finally or
exclusively whether the item has been identified; rather,
the court decides only whether sufficient evidence has
been introduced from which a reasonable jury could
find the evidence identified. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1219 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ("The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(b)
makes plain that preliminary questions of conditional
relevancy are not determined solely by the judge, for to
do so would greatly restrict the function of the jury ...."),
rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd,
475 u.s. 574 (1986).
In other words, the offering party need only make a
"prima facie" showing of authenticity to gain admissibility, and the jury decides finally whether the evidence has
been sufficiently identified. See United States v. Goichman,
547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ('[l]t is the jury who will
ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not
the court").
Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended
to effect a major change in the chain of custody requirements is unclear. Two commentators have written that
"Rule 901(a) can easily be read as doing away with any
chain of custody requirement." S. Saltzburg & M. Martin,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 478 (5th ed. 1990).
Several decisions of the Fifth Circuit contain language
that supports this view. For example, the court has written that "chain of custody goes to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence, and is thus reserved for
the jury." Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154
(5th Cir. 1981). Accord United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d
1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir.) ("any break in the chain of custody of physical evidence does not render the evidence
inadmissible but instead goes to the weight that the jury
should accord that evidence."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2038 (1991).
The Second Circuit also appears to have adopted this
less stringent standard: "Fed.R.Evid. 901 requires that to
meet the admissibility threshold the government need
only prove a rational basis for concluding that an exhibit

is what it is claimed to be." United States v. Han, 904 F.2d
803, 809 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 789 (1991).
Other federal courts of appeal, however, continue to
apply the pre-Rule's "reasonable probability" standard.
E.g., United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); United States v.
Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
491 U.S. 909 (1989); United States v. Rans, 851 F.2d 1111,
1114 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Roberts, 844F.2d
537, 550 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988).
In United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989),
the First Circuit stated the rule as follows:
In the last analysis, the prosecution's chain-of-custody
evidence must be adequate:-- not infallible. Here,
some links in the chain were rusty, but none were
missing. Without question, the defense succeeded in
showing a certain sloppiness, regrettable in a forensic
laboratory. Yet the net effect of any such disarray on
the authenticity of the evidence depended on what
inferences a reasonable factfinder might choose to
draw from it. Where, as in this case, a trier chooses
among plausible (albeit competing) inferences,
appellate courts should not intrude. /d. at 957.
Accordingly, the evidence was admissible. The same
court, however, ruled that another item of evidence
should have been excluded due to a "missing link" that
resulted from a discrepancy between laboratory identification numbers: "In short, there was no competent proof
to indicate that the sample extracted from Massey's
corpse was the one which CSL tested. An important
step in the custodial pavane was omitted." 885 F.2d at
957. See also Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 639
(Ind. 1991) ('[T]he State need not establish a perfect
chain of custody, and any gaps go to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility'), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1299 (1992).

Ingle v. State, 1761nd. App. 695, 707,377 N.E.2d 885,
892 (1975); State v. Beaudoin, 386 A.2d 731, 733 (Me.
1978); Renner v, Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 373
N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. App. 1985).
In satisfying its burden of proof, the prosecution is
frequently aided by the "presumption of regularity." As
one court has commented:
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the trial
judge was entitled to assume that this official would
not tamper with the sack and can or their contents.
Where no evidence indicating otherwise is produced,
the presumption of regularity supports the official acts
of public officers, and courts presume that they have
properly discharged their official duties. Gallego v.
United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960).
Accord United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244,250 (7th Cir.
1988); United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1116 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
The presumption of regularity, however, has been criticized by some courts:
The presumption of regularity, if it can be dignified as a
rule, does not serve as a substitute for evidence when
authenticity is, as here, challenged on not insubstantial
grounds. At best it may relieve the government of the
necessity for offering proof of custody until the integrity
of the evidence has been put in issue. United States v.
Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1975)
See also United States v. Lampson, 627 F. 2d 62,65
(7th Cir. 1980) ("The Government's burden ... cannot be
diluted by unwarranted presumptions about the evidence
it seeks to introduce"); Bauer v. Veith, 374 Mich. 1, 3, 130
N.W.2d 897, 899 (1964) (presumption cannot be used to
"supply missing links in the chain"); 9 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 2534, at 488 (3d ed. 1940) (presumption of
regularity "more often mentioned than enforced").

Application of the Standard of Proof
To satisfy its burden of proof, the prosecution need not
eliminate every possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering. The "mere possibility of a break in the chain
does not render the physical evidence inadmissible, but
raises the question of weight to be accorded by the
jury ..." United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 951 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985). Accordingly, discrepancies are not always fatal. Numerous cases
hold that minor discrepancies affect the weight and not
admissibility of the evidence:
Incorrect weight: United States v. Godoy, 528 F.2d
281, 283 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Zipprich, 141 Ill. App.
3d 123, 490 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1986); People v. Julian, 41
N.Y.2d 340, 342, 360 N.E.2d 1310, 1312, 392 N.Y.S.2d
610, 612 (1977).
Incorrect number: United States v. Han, 904 F.2d
803, 810 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 789
(1991); United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 833 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
Incorrect date: United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d
570, 572 (1st Cir. 1970); State v. Smith, 463 So. 2d 1003,
1005 (La. App. 1985).
Incorrect labeling: United States v. Allocco, 234 F.2d
955, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 931 (1956);

METHODS OF PROOF
A chain of custody may be established in a number of
ways, some of which are discussed below.

Stipulation
The chain may be the subject of a stipulation. See .
People v. Perine, 82111. App. 3d 610, 612,402 N.E.2d 847,
849 (1980) (chain of custody stipulated); People v.
Maurice, 31 Ill. 2d 456, 458, 202 N.E.2d 480, 481 (1964)
(stipulation failed to state that the material seized from
defendant was same material tested by chemist; admission held error); State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 541 (Me.
1980) (stipulation that police maintained proper chain of
custody of knife while in their possession).
Refreshing Recollection
If the chain of custody is established by the testimony
of the persons ("links") who had possession of the
object, these witnesses may refresh their recollections
by referring to any available documentation. See Fed. R.
Evid. 612 (use of writings to refresh memory); United
States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.) (in establishing chain of custody, officers "refreshed their
recollection from official records"), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
857 (1971).
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·Habit and Routine Practice Evidence
The proponent may also introduce evidence of habit or
routine practice to establish the chain of custody. Federal
Rule 406 provides that "(e]vidence of the habit of a
person or of the routine practice of an organization .. :
is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity
with the habit or routine practice."
Accordingly, evidence of the standard operating procedures of police departments and laboratories in
safeguarding real evidence may be used to establish the
chain of custody. See United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d
1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1982) (evidence handled by government according to "established procedures"); United
States v. Luna, 585 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) ("normal police
procedure"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978); State v.
Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 62, 288 N.E.2d 296, 302
(1971) ("standard operating procedure" of laboratory).

criminal cases." S. Rep. No. 1277,93 Gong., 2d Sess. 17,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 7051,7064.
The scope of the police records exclusion has divided
the courts. Some courts seem to apply a per se rule,
under which all police reports are automatically excluded, United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir.
1977), while others have adopted a more flexible
approach. For example, some courts have held that
Congress "did not intend to exclude (police] records of
routine, nonadversarial matters." United States v.
Hernandez-Rajas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Orozco, 590
F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049
(1979). It may be that chain of custody records will be
considered routine nonadversarial records.
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1980), is one of the few cases dealing with the admissibility of chain of custody documents under the Federal
Rules. The defendant contended that police reports are
never admissible when offered by the prosecution, and
thus DEA forms of chemical analysis and lock-seal envelopes containing notations of the date, time, and location
of the sale of heroin and an identification of the seller by
a John Doe number were inadmissible. The court rejected this argument, holding that the documents were not
unreliable on the ground that they were prepared for the
purpose of litigation. Although the court recognized that
the forms "have certain indicia of 'police reports,' " it
found that the forms and lock-sealed envelopes
contained "only skeletal information, and are prepared
not solely with an eye towards presentation, but towards
preserving a record of the chain of custody." /d. at 912.

Documentary Evidence
Sometimes the chain of custody has been established
by documentary evidence. E.g., United Statesv. Luna,
585 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) (police "accounted for the
evidence, either by official records or by testimony
concerning normal police procedure"), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 852 (1978); Graham v. State, 2531nd. 525, 533,255
N.E.2d 652, 654 (1970) ("police custody records" may be
used to establish chain of custody).
For example, courts have held that laboratory slides
and labels on specimen bottles fall within the federal
Business Records Act because they had been prepared
by hospital personnel in the regular course of business.
See United States v. Duhart, 496 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974); Gass v. United States,
416 F.2d 767, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
These cases, however, predate the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule 803(8)(8), which
governs the public records exception, specifically
excludes "in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel." According to the legislative history, this exclusion was based on
the belief that "observations by police officers at the
scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant
are not as reliable as observations by public officials in
other cases because of the adversarial nature of the
confrontation between the police and the defendant in
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